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The  1980  enactment  of  legislation  extending  au- 
thority  to  offer  interest-bearing  checking  instruments 
to  all  depository  institutions  has  brought  intensified 
competition  for  consumers’  transaction  balances.  The 
rise  in  market  interest  rates  over  the  last  decade, 
moreover,  has  induced  nonbank  financial  institutions 
to  compete  aggressively  for  transaction  deposits  - 
once  the  sole  domain  of  commercial  banks.  Banks 
have  had  to  face  the  possibility  that  they  can  no 
longer  rely  on  noninterest-bearing  deposits  as  a 
major  source  of  funds.  Through  the  first  three- 
quarters  of  1981,  for  example,  U.S.  commercial 
banks  experienced  a  reduction  of  nearly  $50  billion 
in  traditional  demand  deposit  accounts.  These  de- 
velopments,  which  adversely  affect  bank  costs  and 
profitability,  have  forced  depository  institutions  to 
devote  increased  attention  to  strategies  for  attracting 
deposits. 
After  a  brief  historical  review  of  government  re- 
strictions  on  interest  payments  on  deposits  and  their 
effects  on  commercial  bank  behavior,  this  article  de- 
scribes  current  competitive  strategies  and  deposit 
experiences  of  banks  and  thrift  institutions.  Special 
attention  is  devoted  to  the  deposit  pricing  decision, 
the  impact  of  interest-bearing  checking  accounts  on 
the  marginal  cost  of  funds,  and  implications  for 
competition  among  depository  institutions. 
Deposit  Interest  Restrictions: 
Cause  and  Effect 
The  Banking  Act  of  1933,  passed  in  the  midst  of 
the  nation’s  most  serious  financial  crisis,  was  in- 
tended  to  restore  confidence  and  financial  stability  to 
the  banking  industry.  In  addition  to  establishing 
deposit  insurance  for  participating  banks,  the  legis- 
lation  included  provisions  restricting  the  payment  of 
interest  on  bank  deposits-a  practice  that  was  widely 
blamed  for  the  industry’s  problems.,  In  an  effort  to 
end  what  was  termed  “destructive”  interest  rate 
competition,  interest  on  demand  deposits  was  totally 
prohibited  and  the  Federal  Reserve  System  was  given 
authority  to  set  maximum  rates  payable  on  time  and 
savings  deposits  for  its  member  banks.  The  Banking 
Act  of  1935  subjected  nonmember  banks  to  similar 
legislation  under  the  authority  of  the  Federal  De- 
posit  Insurance  Corporation.1 
The  practice  of paying  interest  on  demand  deposits 
can  be  traced  far  back  in  U.  S.  financial  history. 
Concern  over  the  possibly  harmful  effects  of  such 
payments  first  arose  around  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth  century.  The  original  concern  was  not  with 
interest  on  personal  demand  deposits  so  much  as  the 
large  New  York  banks’  practice  of  paying  interest  on 
balances  held  with  them  by  other  banks  throughout 
the  country.  These  interbank  balances  were  main- 
tained  as  payment  for  correspondent  banking  ser- 
vices  but  also  served  as  liquid  earning  reserves  of 
smaller  banks.  As  a  consequence  of  these  interbank 
ties,  it  was  commonly  believed  that  the  health  of  the 
nation’s  banking  system  was  too  dependent  on  the 
New  York  banks. 
A  series  of financial  panics  occurred  over  the  latter 
half  of  the  1800s  and  early  1900s.  These  crises  took 
place  when  many  country  banks  drew  down  their 
demand  balances  with  New  York  banks  while  tight 
credit  conditions  hampered  the  liquidation  of  call 
loans.  Since  country  banks  deposited  liquid  funds 
with  the  largest  banks  to  earn  interest,  many  believed 
the  elimination  of  interest  payments  on  such  accounts 
to  be  an  obvious  solution  to  the  frequent  crises. 
After  the  establishment  of  the,  Federal  Reserve 
System  in  1913,  member  banks  could  borrow  at  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  discount  window  to  relieve  short- 
term  liquidity  pressures.  Once  the  discount  window 
was  available,  banks  utilized  it  with  increasing  fre- 
quency.2  Meanwhile,  rural  banks  continued  to  hold 
1 The  interest  prohibition  on  demand  deposits  is  still  in 
effect.  The  authority  to  set  interest ceilings  on  time  and 
savings  deposits,  under  provisions  of  the  Depository  In- 
stitutions  Deregulation  and  Monetary  Control  Act  of 
1980,  has  been  transferred  to  the  Depository  Institutions 
Deregulation  Committee  and  is  to  be  totally  phased  out 
by  1986. 
2 The  percentage  of  member  banks  using  the  window 
grew  from  25  percent  in  1915  to  76  percent  in  1921.  [4, 
p. 38] 
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spondents. 
The  willingness  and  ability  of  members  to  borrow 
from  the  Federal  Reserve  weakened  the  “financial 
crises”  argument  for  restricting  interest  payments  on 
deposits.  However,  bankers  and  regulators  continued 
to  believe  that  there  was  a  relationship  between  the 
payment  of  interest  on  demand  deposits  and  unsound 
banking  practices  contributing  to  bank  failures.  The 
“unsound  banking”  argument  for  restricting  the  pay- 
ment  of  interest  on  deposits  was  based  on  the  belief 
that  banks  were  forced  to  increase  the  riskiness  of 
their  investments  in  order  to  pay  interest  on  deposits. 
This  argument,  together  with  the  occurrence  of  mass 
bank  failures  in  the  1930s,  led  to  the  enactment  of 
interest  controls  on  deposits. 
The  argument  has  since  been  utilized  to  support 
the  continuation  of  deposit  interest  controls  in  spite 
of  mounting  evidence  that  it  is  an  inaccurate  descrip- 
tion  of  bank  behavior  and,  moreover,  that  deposit 
interest  controls  have  had  harmful  effects  on  individ- 
ual  sectors  of  the  economy.  George  Benston,  for 
example,  tested  the  validity  of  the  unsound  banking 
argument  and  its  implications  for  bank  behavior.  His 
results  indicate  that  banks  act  to  maximize  profits  by 
equalizing  the  marginal  interest  cost  of  a  dollar  of 
deposits  with  the  marginal  earnings  from  a  dollar  of 
deposits.  He  rejects  the  argument  that  banks  are 
forced  to  increase  the  riskiness  of  investments  in 
order  to  pay  a market  rate  on  deposits.  Benston  con- 
cludes  that  “the  interest  rate  on  deposits  offered  by  a 
bank  is  a function  of the  investment  possibilities  (and 
their  associated  risks)  available  to  the  banker,  rather 
than  the  reverse.” 
Interest  restrictions  had  little  if  any  impact  on 
banks  until  after  World  War  II.  Until  then,  market 
interest  rates  were  so  low  that  banks  could  pay  an 
implicit  competitive  return  on  deposits  by  providing 
banking  services  below  cost.  Moreover,  following 
the  bank  failures  of  the  1930s,  banks  reduced  their 
holdings  of interbank  balances  and  held  large  amounts 
of  liquid  cash  reserves.  In  the  1950s,  as  market  rates 
of  interest  rose,  development  of  the  Federal  funds 
market  as  both  a  source  of  funds  and  an  investment 
outlet  for  excess  reserves  provided  a  way  for  banks 
to  bypass  the  prohibition  of  interest  on  interbank 
balances. 
In  recent  decades,  as  market  rates  fluctuated,  banks 
slowly  adjusted  their  implicit  payments  to  customers 
by  providing  new  financial  services,  additional  con- 
veniences  (e.g.,  branch  locations,  drive-up  windows, 
extra  tellers,  etc.),  and  even  lower  rates  on  loans  to 
their  best  customers.  These  devices  have  been,  in  the 
words  of  Friedman,  a  “highly  effective  though  not 
perfect  substitute  for  the  explicit  payment  of  interest 
on  demand  deposits.“3  Banks,  however,  have  been 
either  unable  or  unwilling  to  raise  these  implicit 
interest  payments  as  much  or  as  quickly  as  market 
rates  have  risen.  Perhaps  this  is  because  many  de- 
positor  services  are  already  offered  “free”  and  it 
takes  considerable  time  and  expense  to  offer  addi- 
tional  services  and  facilities. 
As  market  rates  eventually  rose  above  the  implicit 
payments  on  demand  accounts  and  interest  ceilings 
on  time  and  savings  deposits,  the  opportunity  cost  of 
holding  balances  in  these  accounts  increased.  In 
response,  an  organized  effort  by  firms-often  in 
cooperation  with  their  banks-developed  to  speed  the 
collection  of payments  and  minimize  the  level  of funds 
held  in  accounts  yielding  interest  in  implicit  forms. 
The  increased  opportunity  cost  of  holding  idle  cash 
balances  and  the  improvement  in  cash  management 
techniques  resulted  in  reduced  demands  for  non- 
interest-bearing  bank  deposits.  Corporate  treasurers 
moved  increasingly  into  liquid  money  market  instru- 
ments  bearing  market  interest  rates.  Large  money 
center  banks  especially  felt  the  loss  of  corporate  de- 
mand  deposits  since  they  relied  more  heavily  on  this 
source  of  funds  than  smaller  banks.  In  response, 
these  banks  utilized  a  series  of  new  liability  instru- 
ments  paying  market  rates  to  retain  corporate  funds 
throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s  (e.g.,  negotiable 
certificates  of  deposit,  repurchase  agreements,  and 
Eurodollar  deposits). 
Deposit  alternatives  for  smaller  customers  de- 
veloped  more  slowly.  The  authorization  of  telephone 
transfers  in  the  1960s  and  pre-authorized  transfer 
accounts  in  the  1970s  increased  the  liquidity  of 
interest-bearing  savings  accounts  at  banks  and  thrifts 
to  some  extent.  Interest-bearing  transaction  account 
substitutes  for  customers  developed  further  following 
the  introduction  of  Negotiable  Order  of  Withdrawal 
(NOW)  accounts  in  Massachusetts  in  1972  and 
credit  union  share  drafts  and  money  market  funds 
3 [10,  p.  24]  An  extensive  literature  has  developed  test- 
ing  the  effectiveness  of  deposit  interest  controls.  Klein 
[14],  for  example,  found  that  the  postwar  demand  for 
money  experience  suggests  that  the  interest  prohibition 
was  ineffective.  Startz  [25]  concludes  that  banks  im- 
plicitly  pay  approximately  50  percent  of  the  explicit 
interest  that  would  be  paid  in  the  absence.  of  the  interest 
prohibition.  Rush  [23],  using  recent  New  England  data, 
argues  that  Startz’s  estimates  of  the  implicit  interest  paid 
by  banks  is  biased  downwards  and  cites  evidence  sup- 
porting  the  “competitive  rate  hypothesis”-i.e.,  that  banks 
(implicitly)  pay  competitive  rates  of  interest. 
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NOW  experiment  was  subsequently  extended  to 
other  northeastern  states.  In  late  1978,  commercial 
banks  nationwide  received  regulatory  permission  to 
pay  interest  on  savings  accounts  that  could  be  used 
for  making  third  party  payments.  These  automatic 
transfer  savings  (ATS)  accounts,  as  well  as  NOWs 
and  share  drafts  are  direct  substitutes  for  demand 
deposits..  These  deposit  instruments,  however,  re- 
main  subject  to  deposit  interest  ceilings.  The  recent 
development  of  the  retail  repurchase  agreement  has 
facilitated  the  payment  of  market-level  interest  rates 
on  portions  of  consumers’  liquid  balances  and  en- 
hanced  the  ability  of  depository  institutions  to  retain 
these  funds. 
New  England  NOW  Competition 
The  introduction  of  NOWs  by  savings  banks  in 
Massachusetts  in  1972,  followed  shortly  by  thrifts 
in  New  Hampshire,  made  it  possible  for  these  insti- 
tutions  to  pay  explicit  interest  on  what,  in  effect,  are 
checking  accounts.  Commercial  banks,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  not  initially  allowed  to  offer  interest- 
bearing  transaction  accounts  in  these  states.  The 
commercial  banks,  as  a  result,  were  threatened  with 
large  losses  of  consumer  deposits.  Relief  was  pro- 
vided  in  August  of  1973,  however,  when  Congress 
authorized  all  commercial  and  savings  banks,  S&Ls, 
and  cooperative  banks  in  New  Hampshire  and  Mas- 
sachusetts  to  offer  NOWs. 
The  New  England  evidence  indicates  that  explicit 
interest  payments  were  frequently  accompanied  by 
the  pricing  of  transaction  services  that  were  previ- 
ously  provided  free.4  The  early  pricing  strategies 
used  for  these  accounts  were  varied.  Massachusetts 
savings  banks,  for  example,  initially  paid  5¼  percent 
interest  on  NOWs  with  a  15  cent  fee  typically  im- 
posed  on  each  draft  written.  New  Hampshire  thrifts, 
on  the  other  hand,  began  paying  4  percent  interest 
and  charging  no  service  fees  on  NOW  accounts  to 
customers.  Many  commercial  banks  also  initially 
offered  NOW  accounts  without  fees.  During  1974, 
however,  commercial  banks  began  imposing  mini- 
mum  balance  requirements  with  associated  penalty 
fees  to  discourage  low  balance  demand  deposit  cus- 
tomers  from  shifting  into  NOW  accounts.  Thrifts 
meanwhile,  typically  moved  in  the  opposite  direction 
by  offering  free  NOWs.  As  a  result,  average  bal- 
4 This  section  draws  heavily  upon  the  work  of  Kimball. 
[12,13] 
ances  in  NOW  accounts  at  commercial  banks  were 
considerably  larger  than  those  at  thrifts.  The  aver- 
age  balance  in  Massachusetts  commercial  banks  in 
1976  was  $2,149,  for  example,  compared  to  $826  at 
S&Ls,  and  $901  at  savings  banks. 
In  March  1976,  Congress  permitted  all  depository 
institutions  in  New  England  to  market  NOWs. 
These  accounts  quickly  received  widespread  accept- 
ance  by  consumers.  In  Massachusetts,  for  example, 
three-quarters  of  the  households  owned  NOW  ac- 
counts  by  1977.  In  1978  and  1979,  respectively,  New 
York  and  New  Jersey  were  added  to  the  list  of  states 
where  NOWs  were  legal. 
The  spread  of  NOW  accounts  in  New  England 
was  not  uniform  across  states.  One  study  used  the 
number  of  NOW  accounts  per  100  households  to 
compare  NOW  growth  experiences.  It  found  the 
proportion  of  households  owning  NOW  accounts  to 
be  positively  correlated  both  with  the  proportion  of 
financial  institutions  in  each  state  offering  NOWs 
and  with  the  proportion  of financial  institutions  which 
offer  them  free,  and  negatively  related  to  the  average 
minimum  balance  requirement.  How  extensively 
NOW  accounts  spread,  therefore,  depends  impor- 
tantly  upon  both  the  pricing  and  availability  of  the 
accounts.  For  example,  in  Massachusetts  and  New 
Hampshire  minimum  balance  requirements  were  low, 
a  high  percentage  of  institutions  provided  free 
NOWs,  and  a  high  proportion  of  institutions  offered 
the  accounts.  Consequently,  a  large  percentage  of 
households  shifted  to  NOWs.  By  contrast,  fewer 
institutions  in  Maine  and  Vermont  offered  NOWs 
and  only  a  small  percentage  were  free  of  service 
charges.  As  a  result,  fewer  households  acquired 
NOWs  in  these  states. 
Bank  and  thrift  market  shares  depended  upon  the 
same  factors  that  influenced  the  overall  growth  of 
NOWs  within  states,  i.e.,  the  availability  of  NOW 
accounts  and  pricing  factors.  In  Massachusetts,  for 
example,  the  number  of  banks  initially  offering 
NOWs  was  lower  relative  to  thrifts  than  in  other 
states.  As  a  result,  the  commercial  bank  market 
share  of  NOW  accounts  was  below  that  in  other 
states.  Also,  thrifts  realized  larger  NOW  shares  in 
states  where  the  disparity  between  bank  and  thrift 
pricing  was  the  greatest. 
Since  NOW  accounts  are  direct  substitutes  for 
checking  accounts,  demand  for  regular  checking  ac- 
counts  fell  when  NOWs  became  available.  The  data 
from  New  England  indeed  show  that  total  outstand- 
ing  personal  checking  accounts  fell  while  NOW  bal- 
ances  grew  an  average  of  8  percent  per  month  for 
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accounts.5  It  is  difficult,  however,  to  estimate  what 
percentage  of  the-growth  in  NOWs  came  from  de- 
mand  deposits  and  what  percentage  was  derived  from 
other  sources.  Previous  research  suggested  that 
between  60  and  80  percent  of  NOW  funds  were 
moved  from  regular  demand  deposit  accounts,  with 
the  rest  coming  from  time  and  savings  accounts  and 
from  other  sources. 
The  success  of  the  experience  with  NOWs  in  the 
northeastern  United  States  combined  with  high  mar- 
ket  interest  rates  to  increase  political  support  for 
extending  NOW  accounts  to  the  rest  of  the  country. 
The  Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and  Mone- 
tary  Control  Act  of  1980  authorized  NOW  accounts 
for  banks  and  thrifts  nationwide  effective  Decem- 
ber  31,  1980.  At  the  same  time,  ATS  accounts  for 
all  depository  institutions  and  share  drafts  at  credit 
unions  were  authorized.  Experience  through  the 
first  three  quarters  of  1981  shows  rapid  growth  in 
NOW  balances  both  nationwide  and  in  the  Fifth 
Federal  Reserve  District. 
Nationwide  NOW  Experience 
Table  1  shows  that  NOW  deposits  at  banks  and 
thrifts  and  credit  union  share  drafts  totalled  $12.3 
billion  nationally  on  December  31,  1980.  Since  that 
date,  NOWs  have  experienced  explosive  growth- 
expanding  over  five-fold  to  $54  billion  by  the  last 
week  in  September  1981.  Seventy-eight  percent  of 
this  increase  occurred  in  the  first  three  months  of  the 
year.  While  growth  tapered  off  considerably  in  the 
second  and  third  quarters,  NOWs  still  grew  at 
a  relatively  strong  42  percent  annual  rate  over  the 
period. 
Surveys  of  depository  institutions  conducted  early 
in  1981  indicated  that  most  commercial  banks  and 
savings  and  loan  associations  offer  NOW  accounts 
to  their  customers.  A  nationwide  survey  of  all  banks 
and  S&Ls  conducted  by  Madison  Financial  Corpora- 
tion,  for  example,  found  that  97  percent  of  all  banks 
and  86  percent  of  S&Ls  responding  to  the  survey 
offered  NOWs  during  the  first  quarter  of  1981. 
Significant  differences  exist  between  banks  and 
S&Ls  in  NOW  pricing  and  marketing  strategies. 
Although  all  depository  institutions  uniformly  tend 
to  pay  the  5¼  percent  maximum  allowable  interest 
5 [13,  22]  Kimball  estimates  that  13 percent  of  demand 
deposits  were  converted  to  NOW  accounts  in  the  first 
year  after  the  introduction  of  NOW  accounts  and  nearly 
40 percent  were  switched  by  the  end  of  the  fourth  year. 
on  these  accounts  and  require  either  minimum  or 
average  balances  to  avoid  monthly  account  fees,  bal- 
ance  requirements  are  generally  much  lower  at  S&Ls 
than  at  banks.  The  Madison  survey,  for  example, 
found  minimum  balance  requirements  at  commercial 
banks  averaged  $976  in  the  first  quarter  of  1981, 
more  than  twice  the  $434  requirement  at  S&Ls. 
Similarly,  banks  required  customers  to  satisfy  an 
average  balance  requirement  of  nearly  $1,500  com- 
pared  to  below  $700  for  the  S&Ls.  As  a  result,  the 
actual  average  NOW  balance  at  banks  was  nearly 
$6,000,  almost  four  times  as  large  as  the  $1,500 
average  balance  at  S&Ls. 
Initial  evidence  suggests  that,  through  more  liberal 
NOW  prices,  thrifts  have  succeeded  in  attracting 
deposit  customers  away  from  banks.  Watro  found 
that  differences  in  NOW  pricing  between  banks  and 
thrifts  in  local  markets  influenced  the  relative  pro- 
portions  of  NOW  deposits  held  by  each  type  of  insti- 
tution.  Generally,  thrifts  gained  a  larger  share  of 
NOWs  in  those  markets  where  they  established  the 
greatest  pricing  advantages. 
The  Madison  survey  indicates  that  the  size  of  the 
minimum  balance  requirement  influences  the  per- 
centage  of  new  funds  flowing  into  NOW  accounts. 
The  pricing  differential  has  helped  S&Ls  to  report 
an  average  of  46  percent  of  NOW  deposits  as  new 
funds.  Commercial  banks,  on  average,  reported  only 
7 percent  new  money  among  its  NOW  deposits,  with 
the  rest  being  transferred  from  existing  bank  ac- 
counts.  The  proportion  of  new  funds,  moreover, 
varies  inversely  with  balance  requirements  within 
each  type  of  depository  institution.  Commercial 
banks  with  minimum  balance  requirements  below 
$500,  for  example,  experienced  higher  proportions  of 
new  money  flowing  into  their  NOWs  than  banks 
with  higher  requirements.  On  the  other  hand,  S&Ls 
requiring  minimum  balances  in  excess  of  $1,000 
realized  a  lower  proportion  of  new  funds  in  NOWs 
than  associations  with  lower  balance  requirements. 
Table  1  suggests  that  most  NOW  balances  come 
from  existing  accounts  at  depository  institutions. 
Demand  deposits  held  at  banks  by  individuals,  part- 
nerships,  and  corporations  (IPC)  experienced  a  net 
reduction  of  nearly  $50  billion  through  September 
1981,  amounting  to  15  percent  of  these  demand 
balances  in  banks  at  the  end  of  1980.6  Reductions  in 
6 These  data  are  not  seasonally  adjusted.  Demand  de- 
posits  typically  experience  seasonal  peaks  during  the 
Christmas  season  and  seasonal  troughs  during  the  first 
quarter  of  each  year.  Approximately  half  of  the  demand 
deposit  reduction  in  the  first  quarter  may  be  attributed  to 
seasonal  trends. 
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Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Mutual  Savings  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
331,636.9  13,359.1  6,722.8  8,136.7 
292,084.6  8,994.7  5,490.6  38,360.3 
293,797.0  8,455.1  5,038.8  42,157.2 
282,813.1  8,217.1  4,496.8  45,502.1 
1,708.8  165.3  712.1  1,493.3 
1,563.4  134.8  696.4  1,631.2 
1,671.6  127.0  620.8  1,722.0 
1,709.9  121.7  542.2  1,859.9 
576.4  165.2  3,084.0  1,041.9  1,207.1  4.5  4,867.5  1.3  99,892.5  31.1 
585.2  123.3  2,362.6  4,733.3  4,856.0  8.6  7,804.O  2.2  98,242.2  31.4 
604.1  127.8  2,091.5  5,935.9  6,064.0  9.9  8,759.0  2.4  94,967.6  31.2 
645.0  126.8  1,727.1  6,783.7  6,910.5  10.5  9,282.6  2.6  89,671.7  30.7 
46.6  1,023.8  1,335.3  1,641.1 
42.7  983.0  1,513.3  1,839.2 
48.2  885.8  1,585.5  2,045.7 
59.0  830.0  1,582.5  2,122.9 
333,968.7  14,713.4  11,854.2  12,313.0 
294,275.9  10,235.8  10,062.9  46,564.0 
296,120.9  9,595.7  9,336.6  51,860.8 
285,227.0  9,295.6  8,348.6  56,268.6 













Total  Total 
NOW/ATS/  Transaction 
Share  Drafts  Accounts 
Amount  Market  Amount 
(5)  Share  (1+3+5) 
Market 
Share 
Amount  Market 
Share 
21,495.8  79.5  359,855.5  96.5  153,038.8  47.6 
47,355.0  83.4  344,931.0  95.5  147,664.0  47.1 
50,612.0  82.4  349,448.0  95.2  143,761.8  47.2 
53,719.2  81.9  341,029.1  95.0  138,700.1  47.5 
1,658.6  6.1  4,079.5  1.1  51,164.8  15.9 
1,766.0  3.1  4,025.0  1.1  50,108.1  16.0 
1,848.0  3.0  4,141.0  1.1  48,175.1  15.8 
1,981.6  3.0  4,233.7  1.2  46,183.4  15.8 
2,665.0  9.9  4,047.0 
2,823.0  5.0  4,379.0 
2,932.0  4.8  4,566.0 









17,194.4  5.4 
17,354.3  5.5 
17,516.0  5.8 
17,726.1  6.1 
27,026.5  100.0  372,849.5 
56,800.0  100.0  361,139.0 
61,456.0  100.0  366,914.0 
65,564.2  100.0  359,139.8 
321,290.5  100.0 
313,368.6  100.0 
304,420.5  100.0 
292,281.3  100.0 
Personal  Savings 
1 These  data  are  reported  weekly  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  by  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  with  at  least  $15  million  in  total  deposits.  Since  smaller 
institutions  do  not  report  weekly,  these  data  are  understated  slightly. 
2 NOW  deposits  are  as  of  December  31,  1980.  All  other  data  are  averages  for  the  last  week  in  each  month. 
personal  savings  of  over  $14  billion  at  banks  and  $15 
billion  at  thrifts  were  also  experienced.  While  these 
deposit  categories  were  major  sources  of  NOW 
funds,  perhaps  large  amounts  were  also  withdrawn 
for  investment  in  high  yielding  certificates  of  deposit 
and  money  market  funds.  ATS  accounts  at  banks  fell 
over  $5  billion  during  the  period  as  many  banks 
automatically  converted  these  funds  to  NOW  ac- 
counts.  Telephone  and  pre-authorized  transfer  ac- 
counts  also  lost  substantial  funds  (presumably  to 
NOWs)  at  banks,  S&Ls,  and  mutual  savings  banks. 
Commercial  banks  have  captured  the  lion’s  share 
of  NOW  deposits  in  spite  of  the  more  liberal  pricing 
strategy  of  thrifts.  Banks  have  apparently  been  very 
successful  in  inducing  high  balance  demand  deposit 
customers  (who  have  little  difficulty  meeting  bank 
balance  requirements)  to  crossover  to  the  bank’s 
NOW  account.  By  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of 
1981,  banks  controlled  over  82  percent  of  the  total 
NOW/share  draft  accounts.  This  figure  dropped 
below  81  percent  by  the  end  of  September,  however, 
as  NOW  growth  at  S&Ls  was  particularly  rapid, 
expanding  to  $6.8  billion,  or  over  twelve  percent  of 
these  deposits. 
Commercial  banks  continued  to  dominate  the 
market  for  transaction  deposits,  with  their  market 
share  for  all  such  accounts  combined  falling  only 
slightly  to  95  percent  in  September  1981.  Since 
this  figure  includes  commercial  demand  balances, 
however,  it  actually  overstates  the  commercial  bank 
share  of  total  consumer  transaction  accounts.  The 
Demand  Deposit  Ownership  Survey  conducted  quar- 
terly  by  the  Federal  Reserve  System  has  estimated  a 
relatively  stable  share  of  total  IPC  demand  deposits 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1982 held  by  individuals  of  around  one-third  in  recent 
years.  This  estimate,  however,  fell  below  31  percent 
in  March  1981  and  below  30  percent  in  September 
following  the  large  conversions  of  personal  demand 
deposits  to  NOW  accounts,  Using  these  quarterly 
estimates  to  exclude  nonpersonal  accounts,  commer- 
cial  banks’  share  of  household  transaction  deposits 
was  approximately  91  percent  in  December  1980,  90 
percent  in  March  1981,  and  88  percent  at  the  end  of 
September.  In  nine  months  time,  therefore,  com- 
mercial  banks  lost  approximately  three  percent  of 
total  consumer  transaction  accounts  held  in  deposi- 
tory  institutions. 
Fifth  District  NOW  Experience 
Since  nationwide  figures  include  the  northeastern 
states  where  conversions  to  NOW  accounts  have  oc- 
curred  for  several  years,  NOW  growth  in  regions  of 
the  country  where  these  accounts  were  just  recently 
authorized  might  be  expected  to  outpace  the  national 
average.  This  is  true  for  growth  in  NOW  accounts 
within  the  Fifth  Federal  Reserve  District.  Table  2 
shows  that  commercial  banks,  S&Ls,  and  savings 
banks  in  the  Fifth  District  accumulated  $3½  billion 
in  NOW  accounts  by  September  1981.  In  addition, 
credit  union  share  drafts  in  the  District  increased  to 
$229  million  over  this  period. 
Only  six  commercial  banks  in  the  Fifth  District 
(less  than  one  percent  of  total  District  banks)  and 
39  S&Ls  (ten  percent  of  the  associations)  reported 
NOW  -balances  as  of  December  31,  1980,  the  first 
day  these  accounts  were  available  to  the  public.  By 
the  end  of  September  1981, 97  percent  of  the  report- 
ing  commercial  banks  and  85  percent  of  the  S&Ls 
offered  NOWs  with  $3  billion  and  $500  million, 
respectively,  in  these  accounts.  As  in  the  nationwide 
experience,  it  appears  that  most  of  the  NOW  growth 
came  in  the  year’s  first  quarter  and  was  funded  by 
conversions  from  demand  and  personal  savings  de- 
posits.  IPC  demand  deposits  fell  by  over  $31/3 
billion  during  the  first  three  months  of  the  year  alone 
while  personal  savings  were  reduced  by  nearly  $500 
million.  Though  total  NOW  growth  has  slowed 
since  the  first  quarter,  percentage  increases  remain 
impressive-especially  at  S&Ls  where  NOW  de- 
posits  doubled  from  March  through  September. 
Commercial  bank  NOW  accounts,  in  comparison, 
increased  26  percent  over  the  same  period.  The  de- 
celeration  in  bank  NOW  growth  largely  reflects  the 
slowdown  in  demand  deposit  conversions  to  NOWs 
since  March.  The  erosion  in  personal  savings  deposits 
at  depository  institutions  has,  however,  continued. 
Conversions  from  ATS  accounts  at  banks  appear 
to  have  played  a  fairly  minor  role  in  the  District’s 
NOW  growth  as  banks  have  experienced  a  small  net 
reduction  in  ATS  deposits  since  December  1980. 
Though  many  banks  in  the  District  dropped  their 
ATS  accounts  in  favor  of  NOW  accounts,  a  large 
number  continue  marketing  ATS  and  some  offer  both 
instruments.  ATS  and  telephone  and  pre-authorized 
transfer  accounts  at  credit  unions,  on  the  other  hand, 
experienced  big  declines  in  the  first  three  quarters  of 
1981,  as  have  telephone  and  pre-authorized  transfers 
at  S&Ls. 
Transaction  accounts  at  Fifth  District  credit  unions 
have  fallen  over  $400  million  from  the  beginning  of 
the  year.  Most  of  these  funds  apparently  shifted  to 
other  accounts  within  credit  unions,  as  several  of  the 
largest  credit  unions  in  the  District  imposed  trans- 
action  restrictions  on  these  funds  and  reclassified 
them  as  personal  savings  for  deposit  reporting  and 
reserve  requirement  purposes.  Consequently,  the 
credit  unions’  market  share  of  total  transaction  de- 
posits  was  cut  in  half  to  only  1.4  percent.  This 
development  permitted  commercial  banks  in  the  Dis- 
trict  to  maintain  their  transaction  account  market 
share  over  95  percent  despite  a  net  deposit  loss  of 
nearly  $850  million.  S&Ls,  on  the  other  hand,  more 
than  tripled  their  transaction  accounts  through  Sep- 
tember  and  increased  their  deposit  share  to  almost 
three  percent. 
The  most  dramatic  shift  in  relative  market  shares 
occurred  in  the  NOW/ATS/share  draft  category. 
Savings  and  loan  associations  increased  their  share  of 
these  deposits  to  nearly  ten  percent  in  September 
1981.  Surprisingly,  commercial  banks  also  increased 
their  share  of  these  accounts  through  September  by 
nearly  five  percent,  although  this  percentage  fell  in 
the  third  quarter,  These  gains  in  market  shares  were 
at  the  expense  of  credit  unions  which  accounted  for 
less  than  six  percent  of  these  checkable  deposits  in 
September. 
A  detailed  breakdown  of  the  1981  transaction  de- 
posit  experiences  of  banks  and  thrifts  in  each  Fifth 
District  state  is  presented  in  the  Appendix.  Tables 
4-9  reveal  significant  variations  in  relative  market 
shares  of banks  and  thrifts  across  states.  At  the  same 
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DEPOSITS  OF  FIFTH  DISTRICT  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS’ 
($ millions) 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Mutual  Savings  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
22,460.4  1,399.5  401.8  126.0  1,525.5  79.1  24,387.7  95.8  12,570.6  54.1  596  6  274 
19,099.2  1,321.2  330.5  2,365.8  3,687.0  84.9  23,116.7  96.0  12,080.8  53.0  516  486  170 
19,360.0  1,321.7  327.7  2,709.0  4,030.7  86.0  23,718.4  96.2  11,823.5  52.8  511  493  149 
18,888.7  1,367.0  314.4  2,975.9  4,342.9  84.4  23,546.0  95.6  11,369.9  53.4  526  511  150 
60.3  0  27.4  0  0  0  87.7  .3  782.0  3.4  3  0  0 
57.4  0  27.6  8.0  8.0  .2  93.0  .4  780.0  3.4  3  3  0 
59.5  0  26.3  9.7  9.7  .2  95.4  .4  772.0  3.4  3  3  0 
60.7  0  23.0  10.8  10.8  .2  94.5  .4  725.2  3.4  3  3  0 
12.3  2.5  183.5  10.7  13.2  .7  209.0  .8  7,908.8  34.0  374  39  3 
14.8  3.1  153.5  256.1  259.2  6.0  427.6  1.8  7,624.6  33.5  369  312  4 
14.1  3.2  132.9  355.7  358.9  7.7  505.9  2.1  7,384.0  33.0  365  313  5 
12.8  3.1  119.4  496.3  499.4  9.7  631.6  2.6  6,912.6  32.4  386  326  5 
15.1  208.2  356.5  182.2  390.4  20.2  762.0  3.0  1,979.1  8.5  59  51  13 
12.1  184.8  45.1  202.2  387.0  8.9  444.2  1.8  2,288.9  10.1  60  53  11 
12.1  63.1  44.3  224.4  287.5  6.1  343.9  1.4  2,408.4  10.8  60  55  10 
11.3  65.5  43.8  229.1  294.6  5.7  349.7  1.4  2,303.5  10.8  69  61  11 
22,540.2  1,610.2  969.2  318.9  1,929.1  100.0  25,446.4  100.0  23,248.5  100.0  1,032  96  290 
19,183.5  1,509.1  556.7  2,832.1  4,341.2  100.0  24,081.4  100.0  22,774.3  100.0  948  854  185 
19,445.7  1,388.0  531.2  3,298.8  4,686.8  100.0  24,663.6  100.0  22,387.9  100.0  939  864  164 
18,973.5  1,435.6  500.6  3,712.1  5,147.7  100.0  24,621.8  100.0  21,311.2  100.0  984  901  166 
Source:  Report  of  Transaction  Accounts,  Other  Deposits,  and  Vault  Cash  (FR  2900). 
1 These  data  are  reported  weekly  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  by  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  with  at  least  $15  million  in  total  deposits.  Since  smaller  institutions  do  not  report  weekly, 
these  data  are  understated  slightly.  Data  exclude  six  West  Virginia  counties  located  in  the  Fourth  Federal  Reserve  District. 
2 NOW  deposits  are  as  of  December  31,  1980.  All  other  data  are averages  for  the  last  week  in  each  month. 
time,  the  results  closely  resemble  experiences  ob-  the  country  where  significant  pricing  differentials 
served  in  other  regions  of  the  country.  In  general,  between  banks  and  thrifts  ‘persist  erosion  in  bank 
the  ability  of  thrifts  to  capture  significant  market  shares  of  NOW  deposits  is  likely.  In  the  Fifth  Dis- 
shares  of  checkable  deposits  is  directly  related  to  the  trict,  commercial  banks  in  each  state  have  seen  reduc- 
relative  strength  of  thrifts  in  deposit  markets  at  the  tions  in  their  market  shares  of  total  balances  held  in 
beginning  of  the  period.  NOW/share  drafts  since  the  first  quarter  of  1981. 
Relative  pricing  strategies  for  these  deposits  also  The  key  question  is  whether  this  trend  will  con- 
affect  the  relative  market  shares  of  banks  and  thrifts.  tinue,  i.e.,  will  S&Ls  continue  to  undercut  banks  in 
A  review  of  the  New  England  NOW  experiment  the  pricing  of  NOWs?  Specifically,  will  lower  bal- 
concluded  that  the  monopoly  position  that  commer-  ance  requirements  at  thrifts  persist?  Or  will  S&Ls 
cial  banks  previously  enjoyed  in  the  provision  of third  be  forced  by  cost  considerations  to  price  NOWs  more 
party  payment  accounts  contributed  heavily  to  the  like  banks  after  they  analyze  their  initial  experience? 
early  success  of  banks  in  marketing  NOWs.  In  the  Some  observers  have  suggested  that  S&Ls  have 
long  run,  however,  the  commercial  bank  share  of  priced  NOWs  as  a  “loss  leader”  in  an  attempt  to 
NOW  deposits  will  depend  chiefly  upon  the  ability  capture  consumer  business  from  banks  and  that 
of  banks  to  attract  new  NOW  deposits.  In  recent  thrifts  can  be  expected  eventually  to  raise  their  bal- 
years,  commercial  banks  in  most  of the  New  England  ance  requirements  on  NOW  accounts.  Regardless  of 
states  have  experienced  significant  erosion  in  their  the  validity  of  this  particular  point,  the  pricing  deci- 
NOW  market  shares.  Kimball  cites  the  NOW  sions  of  banks  and  thrifts  will  certainly  play  a  critical 
pricing  differential  as  an  important  explanation  for  role  in  the  future  competition  for  household  transac- 
this  trend.  It  therefore  follows  that  in  other  areas  of  tion  accounts. 
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there  exists  surprisingly  little  analysis  of  NOW  pric- 
ing.7  This  is  unfortunate.  For  before  one  can  ex- 
plain  the  price  differential  between  banks  and  thrifts 
and  predict  the  future  course  of  those  prices,  one 
needs  to  specify  the  determinants  of  NOW  prices. 
Accordingly,  the  remaining  sections  of  this  article 
will  (a)  employ  microeconomic  price  theory  to  ex- 
amine  the  deposit  pricing  decision,  (b)  explain  the 
NOW  pricing  differential  on  the  basis  of  calculations 
of  the  marginal  cost  of  NOW  deposits  at  banks  and 
thrifts,  and  (c)  theorize  on  what  the  analysis  implies 
for  future  competition  for  interest-bearing  transaction 
accounts. 
Microeconomics  of  Pricing  Deposits 
Price  theory  provides  guidance  to  the  firm  in  its 
decision  to  employ  variable  inputs.  To  maximize 
profits,  each  firm  should  employ  additional  units  of 
each  factor  of  production  until  the  addition  to  total 
resource  cost  equals  the  additional  revenue  gained 
from  the  increased  output  produced  by  the  extra 
resources.8  If  it  is  necessary  for  the  firm  to  increase 
its  factor  payment  to  attract  additional  inputs,  the 
firm  will  face  a  positively  sloped  resource  supply 
curve,  as  illustrated  in  Exhibit  A.  But  if  the  supply 
curve  is  positively  sloped,  the  marginal  resource  cost 
(MRC)  curve  will  also  be  upward  sloping  and  will 
lie  above  the  supply  curve.  The  upward  sloping 
MRC  curve  lies  above  the  supply  curve  because  the 
higher  payment  for  additional  units  of  the  input  must 
be  paid  to  all  (both  additional  and  previously  em- 
ployed)  units.  The  profit  maximizing  employment 
level  will  occur  at  input  usage  Q0,  where  the  mar- 
ginal  revenue  product  and  marginal  resource  cost 
curves  intersect.  The  factor  input  will,  in  turn, 
7 One  exception  is  offered  by  Simonson  and  Marks.  [24] 
Their  analysis,  however,  estimates  the  effect  of  the  intro- 
duction  of  NOW  accounts  on  the  weighted  average  cost 
of  total  bank  funds  when  all  NOW  balances  are  derived 
from  existing  demand  and  regular  savings  deposits  within 
the  bank.  The  present  article  will  use  survey  results  of 
the  sources  of  bank  and  thrift  NOW  balances,  respec- 
tively  to  estimate  the  net  marginal  cost  to  the  institutions 
of  new  funds  attracted  to  the  firm  through  NOWs, 
taking  into  consideration  the  cost  effects  of  internal 
deposit  shifts.  For  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  mar- 
ginal  cost  of  funds  concept  in  banking,  see  Watson.  [27] 
8 In  technical  language,  this  requires  equating  the  mar- 
ginal  resource  cost  (MRC)  to  marginal  revenue  product 
(MRP).  The  marginal  revenue  product  curve  is  the 
firm’s  resource  demand  curve.  it  will  be  negatively 
sloped  if  either  (a)  the  firm  sells  its  product  under  less 
than  perfectly  competitive  market  conditions  or  (b)  the 
firm’s  production  function  is  characterized  by  diminishing 
marginal  productivity. 
receive  compensation  equal  to  rO,  At  this  rate,  each 
input  unit  employed,  up  to  QO, will  add  more  to  the 
firm’s  revenue  than  to  its  costs,  thus  increasing  its 
profits. 
This  analysis  can  be  applied  to  bankers’  decisions 
to  purchase  funds  to  finance  the  acquisition  of  earn- 
ing  assets.  To  maximize  profits,  each  institution 
should  acquire  deposits  and  other  liabilities  until  the 
marginal  cost  of  each  source  is  equal  to  the  marginal 
revenue  derived  from  its  employment.  Since  the 
marginal  revenue  from  a  dollar  employed  in  a  bank 
is  the  same  regardless  of  the  dollar’s  source,  profits 
will  be  maximized  where  marginal  revenue  equals 
marginal  cost  and  the  marginal  cost  of  each  liability 
source  used  is  the  same. 
For  simplicity,  the  marginal  revenue  of  bank  de- 
posits  can  be  treated  as  perfectly  elastic  or  horizontal 
at  the  market-determined  yield  on  financial  assets  (rm 
in  Exhibit  A).  This  assumes  both  that  banks  are 
“yield  takers”  and  cannot  influence  the  yield  on  in- 
vestments  (e.g.,  in  securities  markets)  and  that  each 
dollar  of  bank  deposits  is  equally  productive  in  gen- 
erating  additional  earning  assets.  To  attract  addi- 
tional  household  transaction  balances  (e.g.,  via  NOW 
Exhibit  A 
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Banks,  therefore,  face  upward  sloping  supply  and 
marginal  resource  cost  curves  for  transaction  bal- 
ances.  Given  these  positively  sloped  curves,  it  follows 
that  the  transfer  of  noninterest-bearing  demand  de- 
posits  to  NOWs  results  in  a  significant  increase  in 
interest  expense  for  balances  already  employed  by 
the  bank.  The  marginal  cost  of  the  additional  trans- 
action  deposits  attracted  to  NOWs,  therefore,  is 
higher  than  the  yield  paid  on  NOW  balances.  Conse- 
quently,  the  bank  will  pay  a  deposit  yield  (r0)  below 
rm, the  marginal  return  on  assets. 
With  this  framework,  one can  observe  the  bank’s 
behavior  in  response  to  a change  in  the  market  return 
on  assets.  If  the  yield  on  bank  investments  increases 
to  rm',  for  example,  the  marginal  revenue  to  be  de- 
rived  from  additional  deposits  exceeds  the  marginal 
cost  of  funds  at  Q0.  To  maximize  profits,  therefore, 
the  bank  should  bid  up  the  yield  on  deposits  in  an 
attempt  to  increase  deposits  to  Q1.  In  deposit  mar- 
kets  where  institutions  are  prohibited  from  increasing 
explicit  interest  payments,  increased  yields  must  take 
implicit  forms. 
The  foregoing  analysis  is  consistent  with  observed 
bank  deposit  pricing  behavior.  For,  as  noted  above, 
the  prohibition  of explicit  interest  on  demand  deposits 
led  banks  to  increase  implicit  yields  on  balances  as 
market  interest  rates  rose.  Conversely,  the  authori- 
zation  of  explicit  interest  payments  on  NOW  and 
ATS  accounts  (together  with  associated  balance  re- 
quirements  and  fees)  has  apparently  induced  banks  to 
reduce  the  implicit  interest  paid  on  these  deposits. 
This  response  is  to  be  expected  if,  as  argued  below, 
the  marginal  cost  of  NOW  deposits  at  banks  is higher 
than  alternative  sources  of  funds.  If  this  is  indeed 
the  case,  profit  maximizing  behavior  requires  the 
bank  to  reduce  the  total  yield  paid  on  NOW  ac- 
counts.  This  reduction  could  be  accomplished  either 
by  charging  explicit  fees  on  bank  services  associated 
with  these  accounts  or  by  encouraging  depositors  to 
hold  higher  average  balances;  both  methods  drive 
down  the  average  implicit  interest  paid. 
Marginal  Cost of  NOW  Deposits 
at  Banks  and  Thrifts 
The  previous  section  argues  that,  given  the  mar- 
ginal  return  on  assets,  the  prime  determinant  of 
yields  on  NOWs  is  the  marginal  cost  of  these  de- 
posits  to  depository  institutions.  Several  factors 
determine  this  marginal  cost.  Perhaps  the  most 
critical  is  the  source  of  funds  flowing  into  NOWs. 
The  calculations  shown  in  Table  3  demonstrate  the 
extreme  dependence  of  the  marginal  cost  estimate  on 
the  composition  of  the  source  of  NOW  balances.  In 
general,  the  marginal  cost  of  NOW  accounts  (1) 
varies  inversely  with  the  percentage  of  NOW  bal- 
ances  that  represent  new  funds  to  the  institution  and 
(2)  for  banks,  varies  directly  with  the  proportion 
shifted  from  demand  deposit  accounts  within  the 
same  institution.  It  will  be  shown  that  a  wide  di- 
vergence  in  the  source  of  NOW  balances  provides 
S&Ls  with the  cost  advantage  they  presently  enjoy 
over  commercial  banks  in  the  competition  for  NOW 
accounts.  Other  factors  influencing  the  marginal 
cost  estimates  include  the  maximum  interest  rates 
payable  on  transaction  and  savings  accounts,  the  level 
of  market  interest  rates,  and  the  implicit  yield  deci- 
sions  of  each  institution. 
Survey  results  indicate  the  present  sources  of 
NOW  funds  for  banks  and  S&Ls.  These  provide  a 
representative  example  of  the  effects  of  the  intro- 
duction  of  NOW  accounts  on  the  marginal  costs  of 
funds  in  each  type  of  institution.  Exhibit  B  details 
the  assumptions  and  calculations  made  for  each  insti- 
tution  in  the  marginal  cost  calculations.  presented  in 
Table  3.  Assume  each  institution  experiences  a  $1 
million  increase  in  5¼  percent  NOW  deposits.  If 
banks  and  thrifts  pay  interest  on  collected  balances,9 
the  gross  interest  expense  on  the  NOW  balances  is 
$48,300  and  $46,200,  respectively.  Several  adjust- 
ments  are  required,  however,  to  arrive  at  the  net 
cost  of  the  additional  funds  attracted  to  the  institu- 
tions.  First,  since  savings  have  shifted  to  NOWs, 
the  commercial  bank  will  experience  a  reduction  of 
$13,125  in  its  savings  account  interest  expense  (using 
the  passbook  savings  rate)  while  savings  interest  at 
the  S&L  will  fall  by  $27,500.  The  net  increase  in 
explicit  interest,  therefore,  is  $35,175  for  the  bank 
and  $18,700  for  the  S&L. 
Secondly,  deposit  shifts  will  affect  the  level  of 
implicit  payments  at  banks  and  thrifts  in  substantially 
different  ways.  Data  for  member  banks  that  partici- 
pate  in  the  Federal  Reserve  Functional  Cost  Analysis 
program  indicate  that  the  net  operating  expense 
(total  operating  expense  less  service  and  handling 
charges)  per  dollar  deposited  in  NOW  accounts  is 
lower  than  that  incurred  on  demand  deposits.  The 
bank  may  realize  operational  savings,  therefore,  on 
the  funds  transferred  from  demand  deposits  to 
9 If  either  or  both  institutions  paid  interest  on  the  full 
$1  million,  the  interest  expense  would,  of  course,  be 
$52,500.  This  would  only  slightly  increase  the  marginal 
cost  estimates  and  would  not  alter  the  results  that  follow. 
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are  associated  with  the  new  funds  in  NOWs.  Table  3 
indicates  that  banks  experience  a  net  reduction  in 
implicit  interest  expense  of  $11,000.  S&Ls,  on  the 
other  hand,  incur  increased  net  operating  expenses 
associated  with  the  servicing  and  maintenance  of 
transaction  accounts.  This  incremental  expense  is 
estimated  at  $30,000  in  Table  3.10 
Adjustments  must  also  be  made  for  changes  in 
reserve  requirements  and  uncollected  balances  result- 
ing-from  deposit  shifts  since  these  factors  will  alter 
the  amount  of funds  actually  available  for  investment. 
The  calculations  in  Table  3 assume  banks  are  subject 
to  a  12  percent  marginal  reserve  requirement  on 
transaction  accounts  while  a  3  percent  reserve  ratio 
is  used  for  S&Ls.11  Under  these  assumptions,  re- 
quired  reserves  on  funds  shifted  from  demand  de- 
posits  to  bank  NOW  accounts  will  not  change.12 
Deposits  shifted  from  personal  savings  accounts 
(with  zero  reserve  requirements),  as  well  as  new 
funds  at  banks  and  thrifts  are  subject  to  the  respec- 
tive  reserve  ratios  on  NOW  balances.  Due  from 
balances  at  each  institution  were  assumed  to  repre- 
sent  10  percent  of  transaction  deposits  while  cash 
items  in  process  of  collection  (CIPC)  were  8 percent 
at  banks  and  12  percent  at  S&Ls.13  Under  these 
10 The  magnitude  of  increased  net  operating  expenses 
(implicit  interest  paid)  on  NOWs  by  S&Ls  is  uncertain 
at  this  point.  For comparative  purposes,  Functional  Cost 
Analysis  data  [9]  for  commercial  banks  were  used  to 
estimate  the  increased  implicit  payments  of  S&Ls.  Since 
average  NOW  balances  at  S&Ls  are  closer  in  size  to 
personal  checking  accounts  at  banks  rather  than  to  NOW 
balances,  the  increased  expenses  were  estimated  using 
net  operating  expenses  per  dollar  in  personal  checking 
accounts.  This  assumes,  therefore,  that  thrift  NOW  ac- 
counts  are  twice  as  expensive  to  service  (4  percent  per 
dollar)  as  bank  NOWs  (2  percent). 
11 We  believe  this  is  justified  for  two  reasons.  First, 
S&Ls  are  much  less  likely  than  banks  to  have  exceeded 
the  $25  million  base  for  transaction  accounts  subject  to 
the  3  percent  reserve  ratio.  In  addition,  even  if  a  large 
S&L  has  exceeded  the  $25  million  base.  under  the  pro- 
visions  of  the  reserve  phase-in  established  in  the  Mone- 
tary  Control  Act,  it  presently  holds  one-fourth  of  the 
fully  phased-in  reserves. 
12 Member  and  nonmember  institutions,  of  course,  are 
affected  differently  by  deposit  shifts  during  the  reserve 
phase-in  period.  Specifically,  required  reserves  for  some 
large  member  banks  could  fall  as  funds  move  from  de- 
mand  deposits  to  NOWs.  On  the  other  hand,  nonmember 
banks’  required  reserves  increase  as  demand  deposit  bal- 
ances  shift  to  NOWs. 
13 Due  from  balances  most  often  represent  correspondent 
balances  on  which  banks  receive  compensation  (in  the 
form  of  services).  No  opportunity  cost  on  these  funds  is, 
therefore,  incurred.  Due  from  balances  and  CIPC  as  a 
proportion  of  bank  transaction  accounts  vary  with  bank 
size.  The  proportion  of  due  froms  generally  declines 
with  bank  size  while  CIPC  increases.  In  addition,  insti- 
assumptions,  total  required  reserves  and  uncollected 
balances  increase  by  $42,440  for  the  bank  and  by 
$83,400  for  the  S&L.  Since  these  funds  are  non- 
earning  assets,  the  institutions  incur  opportunity 
costs  of  $7,215  and  $14,178,  respectively  (assuming 
a  17 percent  return  on  assets). 
The  net  marginal  cost  to  the  bank  of  the  additional 
$100,000,  therefore,  is  $31,390  or  31.4  percent  per 
new  dollar  employed.14  The  cost  figure  for  many 
banks  may  even  be  higher.  Individual  banks  experi- 
encing  smaller  proportions  of  new  funds  flowing  into 
NOWs,  for  example,  will  have  substantially  higher 
marginal  cost  estimates.  Also,  the  implicit  interest 
savings  on  funds  transferred  from  demand  deposits 
may  be  less  than  the  two  percent  figure  used  in 
Table  3.15  If  these  savings  are  reduced  to  one  per- 
cent,  the  marginal  cost  of  NOWs  increases  by  $6,500. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  a  bank  experiences  a  larger 
proportion  of  new  funds  and  fewer  demand  deposits 
shifting  into  NOWs,  the  marginal  cost  estimate  drops 
rapidly.  The  Addendum  to  Table  3,  for  example, 
estimates  17.5  percent  marginal  cost  when  25  percent 
of  NOWs  are  new  funds. 
Regardless  of  the  precise  figure,  these  initial  esti- 
mates  indicate  that  NOW  deposits  represent  an 
expensive  source  of  funds  to  commercial  banks. 
Banks  may  be  experiencing  marginal  NOW  costs 
that  exceed  both  the  cost  of  funds  from  alternative 
money  market  sources  and  the  marginal  revenue 
from  investing  NOW  deposits.  This  situation,  of 
course,  implies  reduced  profits  for  banks. 
tutions  that  are  members  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
have  lower  proportions  of  due  from  balances  and  higher 
CIPC  than  nonmembers.  [15,  p. 22]  Knight’s  data  for 
member  banks  with  total  deposits  between  $50  million 
and  $100  million  indicate  that  due  froms  averaged  ap- 
proximately  10  percent  of  demand  deposits  while  CIPC 
averaged  near  8 percent.  Due  from  balances  at  Virginia 
S&Ls  were  proportionally  much  larger  than  10  percent 
in  June  1981.  This  figure,  however,  includes  S&Ls’  own 
commercial  demand  deposits  at  banks  and  cannot  all  be 
considered  correspondent  balances.  Virginia  S&Ls’  CIPC 
averaged  slightly  over  12 percent  of  total  transaction  bal- 
ances  in  June  1981. 
14 The  calculations  in  Table  3  assume,  for  the  moment, 
that  institutions  would  not  lose  additional  deposits  if 
NOW  accounts  were  not  offered. 
15 In  particular,  depositors  with  larger  than  average  bal- 
ances  in  their  personal  checking  accounts  have  accounted 
for  most  of  the  funds  transferred  to  commercial  bank 
NOW  accounts.  Banks  may  have  previously  incurred 
less  than  the  average  4  percent  implicit  expense  on  each 
dollar  in  these  demand  deposits.  Longbrake  [18],  for 
example,  found  that  holders  of  small  checking  accounts 
receive  greater  implicit  rates  of  interest  than  holders  of 
large  checking  balances.  When  large  balance  deposits 
shift  to  NOW  accounts,  therefore,  banks’  implicit  interest 
savings  may  be  less  than  2  percent. 
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MARGINAL  COST  OF  NOW  ACCOUNTS 
COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  SAVINGS  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS 
Expense  Item 
1.  Source  of  NOW  Deposit  ($1  million) 
2.  Interest  Expense,  Collected 
NOW  Balances  (@5.25%) 
3.  Less:  Reduced  Interest,  Savings  Accounts 
4.  Net  Explicit  Interest  Expense 
5.  Plus:  Net  Change  in  Implicit  Interest 
a.  Reduced  Implicit  Payment  on  Funds 
Shifted  from  DDAs 
b.  Increased  Implicit  Payment  on  Funds 
Shifted  from  Savings 
c.  Implicit  Payment  on  New  Funds 
6.  Net  Change  in  Implicit  Interest 
7.  Net  Explicit  and  Implicit  Interest  Expense 
8.  Adjustments  Due  to  Increase  in 
Nonearning  Assets: 
a.  Increased  Reserves,  Transaction  Accounts 
b.  Increased  uncollected  Balances,  CIPC 
9.  Net  Increase  in  Nonearning  Assets: 
10.  Plus:  Opportunity  Cost  on 
Nonearning  Assets  (@17%);  [@11%] 
11.  Marginal  Cost  of  NOW  Accounts 
(@17%);  [@11%] 
12.  Margined  Cost  per  Dollar  of  New  Funds 
ADDENDUM:  Alternative  Source  of  NOW  Deposit: 
Marginal  Cost  of  NOW  Accounts 
(@17%);  [@11%] 
(Per  Dollar  of  New  Funds) 
Commercial  Banks 
($650,000  DDA,  $250,000  SA,  $100,000  New) 
$48,300 
(@5.25%)  $13,125 
$35,175 
(@-2%)  -113,000 
0 
(@2%)  $2,000 
-$11,000 
$24,175 
(@12%)  $34,440 
(@8%)  $8,000 
$42,440 
($ 7,215)  [$  4,668] 
($31,390)  [$28,843] 
(31.4%)  [28.8%] 
($500,000  DDA,  $250,000  SA,  $250,000  New) 
($43,775)  [$38,9753 
(17.5%)  [15.6%] 
Savings  and  Loan  Associations 

















($14,178)  [$9,174] 
($62,878)  [$57,874] 
(12.6%)  [11.6%] 
($750,000  SA,  $250,000  New) 
($37,379)  [$34,757] 
(15.0%)  [13.9%] 
Economic  theory  predicts  that  the  firm  in  this 
situation  will  reduce  its  employment  of  the  high  cost 
factor  of  production  in  an  effort  to  reduce  costs  and 
maximize  profits.  Consistent  with  that  theory,  it 
does  appear  that  banks  have  attempted  to  limit  their 
marginal  expenses  somewhat  by  discouraging  de- 
mand  deposit  conversions  with  high  minimum  bal- 
ance  requirements  and  penalty  fees.  Still  the  question 
remains:  Why  have  banks  offered  NOWs  to  their 
deposit  customers  at  all  if  these  funds  are  so  expen- 
sive?  The  decision  appears  to  be  a  defensive  strategy 
in  an  effort  to  minimize  bank  losses. 
If  a  bank  does  not  offer  NOWs,  it  runs  an  in- 
creased  risk  of  losing  deposits  to  its  competitors 
(other  banks,  thrifts,  money  market  funds,  etc.). 
These  deposit  losses  would  have  to  be  replaced  at 
market  rates  of interest.  For  example,  in  Table  3, the 
entire  $650,000  in  demand  deposit  accounts  (DDAs) 
could  be  withdrawn  from  the  bank.  If  this  occurred, 
the  increased  interest  expense  of  retaining  these  funds 
through  purchased  liabilities  would  be  approximately 
$78,000.16  Freed  reserves  from  this  alternative 
source  of  funds  could  be  invested,  however,  increas- 
ing  revenue  by  $13,260,17  leaving  a  net  expense  of 
approximately  $65,000.  To  the  bank,  this  would 
represent  a  deadweight  loss  since  no  new  funds  are 
flowing  into  the  bank.  In  this  example,  the  bank  is 
better  off  by  offering  NOW  accounts  even  though  its 
marginal  cost  may  exceed  money  market  rates.  Bank 
profits  will  be  higher  by  purchasing  NOW  deposits 
than  by  replacing  lost  deposits  with  purchased  funds. 
16 This  is  calculated  by  multiplying  the  lost  DDA  funds 
times  12 percent-i.e.,  the  difference  between  the  assumed 
rate  on  purchased  funds  (16  percent)  and  the  net  implicit 
payment  on  DDAs  (4  percent). 
17 $650,000  x  .12  (reserve  ratio)  x  .17  (market  yield)  = 
$13,260. 
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ASSUMPTIONS  AND  CALCULATIONS  FOR  TABLE  3 
Assumption 
1.  Each  institution  experiences  an  increase  of 
$1  million  in  NOWs.  1981  survey  results 
used  as  basis  for  source  of  funds. 
2.  Institutions  pay  interest  on  collected  funds; 
8%  of  bank  NOWs  and  12%  of  S&L  NOWs 
are  in  process  of  collection  (CIPC).  See 
footnote  13  for  source  of  ratios. 
3.  Interest  payments  reduced  on  rovings  ac- 
counts.  Funds  transferred  from  passbook 
accounts. 
4.  (2  -  3) 
5.  1980  Functional  Cost  Analysis  data  for 
commercial  banks  used  to  estimate  changer 
in  implicit  payments  due  to  deposit  shifts. 
a.  (Net  operating  expense  (N.O.E.)  per 
dollar  in  NOWs  minus  N.O.E.  per  dollar 
in  DDAs)  times  funds  shifted  to  NOWs 
from  DDAs. 
b.  Banks:  (N.O.E.  per  dollar  in  NOWs 
minus  N.O.E.  per  dollar  in  regular 
savings  accounts)  times  funds  shifted 
to  NOWs  from  savings. 
S&L:  (N.O.E.  per  dollar  in  personal 
checking  account  minus  N.O.E.  per 
dollar  in  regular  savings)  times  funds 
shifted  to  NOWs  from  savings. 
c.  Banks:  N.O.E.  per  dollar  in  NOWs 
times  new  funds. 
S&Ls:  N.O.E.  per  dollar  in  personal 
checking  times  new  funds. 
6.  (5a  +  5b  +  5c) 
7.  (4  +  6) 
8.  a.  Increased  transaction  accounts  are  sub- 
ject  to  reserve  requirements.  Institutions, 
however,  may  deduct  demand  balances 
due  from  depository  institutions  and 
cash  items  in  process  of  collection  in 
calculating  reserves. 
b.  A  proportion  of  new  funds  attracted  to 
transaction  accounts  is  uncollected  and 
not  available  for  investment.  Funds 
transferred  from  savings  maintain  their 
savings  characteristics  and  do  not  result 
in  increased  uncollected  balances. 
9.  (8a  +  8b) 
10.  Increased  cash  assets  not  invested  experi- 
ence  an  opportunity  cost  at  the  market 
return  on  assets.  Alternative  market  rates 
of  (17%)  and  [11%]  considered. 
11.  (7+10) 
12.  Marginal  cost  of  attracting  each  dollar  of 
new  funds  to  institutions. 
Commercial  Banks 
65%  NOWs  transferred  from  demand  deposits, 
25%  NOWs  transferred  from  swings  accounts, 
10%  NOWs  represent  new  funds  to  institutions. 
$1  m.  X  (1-.08)  X  .0525  =  $48,300 
$250,000  X  .0525  =  $13,125 
(.02  -  .04)  x  $650,000  =  -  $13,000 
(.02  -  .02)  X  $250,000  =  0 
.02  x  $100,000  =  $2,000 
----- 
Reserve  requirement  =  12% 
Due  from  balances  =  10% 
CIPC  =  8% 
[$350,000  X  (1 -(.10  +  .08))]  X  .12  =  $34,440 
$100,000  X  .08  =  $8,000 
($42,440  X  .17  =  $7,215); 
[$42,440  X  .11  =  $4,668] 
A  bank’s  estimate  of  the  proportion  of  deposits 
that  would  flow  out  of  the  bank  in  the  absence  of 
NOW  accounts  is  the  key  determinant  in  the  decision 
to  offer  NOWs.  This  estimate,  in  turn,  depends 
upon  the  competitive  environment  in  which  each  bank 
conducts  its  business.  If  a  bank  is  in  a  highly  com- 
petitive  market  with  readily  available  deposit  substi- 
tutes  at  higher  yields,  a  relatively  large  proportion 
of  deposits  may  leave  the  bank  if  NOWs  are  not 
Savings  and  Loan  Associations 
50%  NOWs  transferred  from  savings  accounts, 
50%  NOWs  represent  new  funds  to  institutions. 
$1  m.  X  (1-.12)  X  .0525  =  $46,200 
$500,000  X  .055  =  $27,500 
No  funds  shifted  from  demand  deposits. 
(.04  -  .02)  x  $500,000  =  $10,000 
.04  x  $500,000  =  $20,000 
----- 
Reserve  requirement  =  3% 
Due  from  balances  =  10% 
CIPC  =  12% 
[$1  m.  X  (1 -(.10  +  .12))]  X  .03  =  $23,400 
$500,000  X  .12  =  $60,000 
($83,400  X  .17  =  $14,178); 
[$83,400  X  .11  =  $9,174] 
-- 
Item  11 ÷  $500,000 
offered.  This  tends  to  influence  the  decision  for  such 
banks  in  favor  of  offering  NOWs.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  bank  with  a  near-monopoly  position  in  a 
market  with  limited  deposit  substitutes  may  believe  it 
faces  limited  deposit  loss  and,  therefore,  decide 
against  offering  NOW  accounts.  Of  course  deposit 
losses  will  be  cumulative  over  time,  weighting  the 
decision  toward  providing  NOWs.  In  Table  3,  the 
“break-even”  deposit-loss  ratio  is  roughly  22  percent 
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banks  expecting  total  attrition  of  more  than  22  per- 
cent  of  DDAs  would  benefit  from  offering  NOWs. 
Those  anticipating  smaller  deposit  losses  might 
decide  not  to  offer  NOW  accounts.19 
The  net  marginal  cost  of  NOW  balances  at  savings 
and  loan  associations  is  estimated  in  Table  3  to  be 
approximately  $63,000  or  12.6  percent  for  each  addi- 
tional  dollar  of  deposits  employed  by  the  firm.  This 
estimate  suggests  that  the  marginal  cost  of  NOWs 
to  thrifts  is  somewhat  below  the  assumed  marginal 
cost  of  alternative  purchased  liabilities  (16  percent) 
and  lower  than  the  assumed  marginal  return  on 
assets  (17  percent).  As  demonstrated  in  the  Adden- 
dum  to  Table  3,  this  relationship  holds  for  thrifts 
experiencing  only  25  percent  new  funds  in  NOWs. 
What  does  this  reveal  about  the  1981  NOW  pric- 
ing  decisions  of thrifts?  Most  importantly,  it  indicates 
that  their  low  balance  requirements  and  free  services 
are  consistent  with  profit  maximizing  behavior.  Any 
thrift  institution  experiencing  marginal  NOW  cost 
below  the  marginal  return  on  assets  can  increase 
profits  by  increasing  yields  on  NOWs  and  attracting 
additional  deposits.  Presently,  the  only  available 
method  to  increase  NOW  yields  is  through  implicit 
payments. 
Savings  and  loan  associations’  income  positions 
have  been  under  severe  pressure  in  recent  years.  In 
large  degree  this  is  because  funds  purchased  at  high 
market  interest  rates  replaced  low  cost  sources  of 
funds  in  S&L  liability  structures.  Concurrently,  the 
dominance  of  long-term,  fixed  rate  (low  interest) 
mortgages  in  S&L  asset  portfolios  has  resulted  in 
the  virtual  elimination  of  profit  margins. 
18 The  “break-even”  deposit  loss  ratio  (d)  is  found  by 
setting  the  net  marginal  costs  of  the  alternative  actions 
equal  (so  that  the  effect  on  profits  will  be  identical): 
[$650,000  x  d  (deposit-loss  ratio)  x  .12  (increased 
interest  expense)]  -  [$650,000  x  d  x  .12  (reserve 
ratio)  x  .17  (market  yield)]  =  $31,390  (Table  3,  item 
11)  -  [.17  (market  yield)  x  $100,000  (new  funds)]. 
Solving  for  d  yields  d  =  .22.  At  lower  market 
interest  rates,  the  break-even  deposit-loss  ratio  in- 
creases  (i.e.,  fewer  banks  might  find  it  optimal  to 
provide  NOWs). 
19 An  alternative  decision-making  technique  would  be 
possible  if  institutions  knew  the  demand  and  savings 
deposit  losses  likely  to  result  from  a  decision  not  to  offer 
NOW  accounts.  An  estimate  of  the  deposit  replacement 
costs  that  were  avoided  (saved)  by  providing  NOWs 
could  then  be  incorporated  into  the  marginal  cost  calcu- 
lations-reducing  the  marginal  ‘cost  estimates  for  each 
institution.  If  this  analytical  technique  were  possible, 
banks  and  S&Ls  would  maximize  profits  by  providing 
NOW  accounts  to  customers  as  long  as  NOW  marginal 
costs  (including  the  cost  savings  estimates)  were  equal  to 
or  below  the  marginal  return  on  assets. 
The  above  analysis  on  the  impact  of  NOW  ac- 
counts  on  the  marginal  cost  of  funds  at  S&Ls  sug- 
gests  NOWs  have  not  been  a  contributing  factor  to 
the  financial  problems  currently  faced  by  the  indus- 
try.  To  the  contrary,  NOWs  may  have  reduced 
associations’  cost  of  funds  and  improved  earnings. 
S&Ls’  profit  experience,  in  other  words,  might  have 
been  worse  without  the  authorization  of  NOW  ac- 
counts.  For  example,  without  NOWs  the  outflow 
of  savings  accounts  from  thrifts  to  money  market 
alternatives  could  have  been  even  worse  than  experi- 
enced,  forcing  S&Ls  either  to  replace  those  additional 
funds  at  higher  interest  or  to  liquidate  assets. 
Implications  for  NOW  Competition 
Between  Banks  and  Thrifts 
Savings  and  loan  associations  apparently  have  a 
substantial  marginal  cost  advantage  over  commercial 
banks  in  the  competition  for  NOW  accounts.  This 
advantage  has  allowed  S&Ls  to  market  and  price  the 
new  deposits  more  aggressively  than  commercial 
banks.  Of  course,  the  maximum  explicit  interest 
S&Ls  can  pay  on  NOWs  is  limited  by  regulation  to 
the  same  rate  offered  by  banks.  Enjoying  lower 
marginal  costs  than  banks,  however,  thrifts  have 
additional  flexibility  to  “bid  up”  the  implicit  pay- 
ments  on  NOW  accounts. 
What  do  these  conclusions  imply  for  the  form  and 
direction  of  future  NOW  competition  between  banks 
and  thrifts?  As  long  as  Regulation  Q  interest  ceil- 
ings  on  NOWs  remain  in  effect,  competitive  strat- 
egies  will  likely  be  expressed  through  implicit  interest 
payments.  The  analysis  in  the  previous  section  indi- 
cates  that  S&Ls  have  a  profit  incentive  to  increase 
implicit  interest  payments  on  NOW  accounts  as  long 
as  their  marginal  cost  remains  below  the  marginal 
return  on  investments.  Early  indications  are  that 
many  S&Ls,  indeed,  plan  to  lower  their  NOW  bal- 
ance  requirements.  A  follow-up  survey  of  banks  and 
S&Ls  conducted  by  Madison  Financial  Corporation 
in  July  1981,  found  that  20.4  percent  of  the  respond- 
ing  S&Ls  were  contemplating  a  price  change  in  the 
near  future.  A  significant  proportion  (19.4  percent) 
of the  S&Ls  stated  that  they  would  price  their  NOW 
accounts  lower  if  they  had  it  to  do  all  over  again 
while  only  2.5  percent  indicated  they  would  increase 
their  price.  Furthermore,  S&Ls  anticipated  mini- 
mum  balance  requirements  for  their  associations 
averaging  $317  by  the  end  of  1981,  compared  to 
$435  during  the  first  quarter. 
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satisfaction  in  their  present  NOW  prices  and  foresee 
little  change  in  minimum  balance  requirements.  If 
the  marginal  cost  of  NOW  deposits  for  banks  is 
indeed  above  the  marginal  return  on  assets  and  mar- 
ginal  cost  of  other  sources  of  funds,  liberalization  of 
bank  NOW  prices  should  not  be  anticipated.  A  con- 
tinuation  or  widening  of  the  pricing  differential,  in 
turn,  is  expected  to  result  in  a  steady  erosion  in 
commercial  bank  shares  of  transaction  accounts. 
This  does  not,  however,  preclude  some  individual 
banks  from  eventually  reducing  NOW  account  prices. 
This  response  is  possible  for  banks  facing  especially 
strong  thrift  competition  or  where  individual  banks 
enjoy  a  significant  inflow  of  new  funds  into  NOW 
accounts. 
As  interest  ceilings  on  time  and  savings  deposits 
and  interest-bearing  checking  accounts  are  phased 
out,  the  marginal  cost  of  NOW  accounts  Will  increase 
at  both  commercial  banks  and  thrift  institutions.  It 
is  anticipated  that  banks  will  competitively  raise  their 
explicit  interest  payments  on  NOWs  while  further 
lowering  implicit  payments.  Reduced  implicit  pay- 
ments  will  probably  be  facilitated  by  explicit  fees  for 
transaction  services.  If  the  marginal  cost  of  NOW 
accounts  for  thrifts,  however,  remains  below  the 
available  return  on  assets,  thrifts  are  more  likely  than 
banks  to  maintain  implicit  subsidies  on  services  re- 
lated  to  transaction  accounts  while  paying  competitive 
explicit  interest. 
If  market  interest  rates  fall,  the  marginal  cost  of 
NOWs  to  depository  institutions  will  also  drop  as 
the  opportunity  costs  on  nonearning  cash  assets  (re- 
serves  and  uncollected  balances)  fall.  The  marginal 
cost  of  NOWs,  however,  may  not  fall  by  as  much  as 
market  interest  rates.  Table  3  provides  alternative 
estimates  for  banks  and  S&Ls  when  the  marginal 
return  on  assets  is  reduced  to  11  percent.  Holding 
the  source  of  funds  constant  results  in  reductions  of 
nearly  three  percent  and  one  percent  in  marginal 
costs  of  NOWs  at  banks  and  S&Ls,  respectively, 
compared  to  the  six  percent  drop  in  market  ‘rates. 
Despite  reduced  costs,  therefore,  the  relative  attrac- 
tiveness  of  employing  NOWs  (instead  of  other 
sources  of  funds)  would  deteriorate  at  both  institu- 
tions  and  reduced  implicit  payments  might  result. 
A  larger  reduction  in  marginal  NOW  costs  is 
possible,  however,  as  market  interest  rates  fall.  The 
proportion  of new  funds  flowing  into  NOW  accounts, 
for  example,  might  increase  as  the  yield  on  NOWs 
becomes  more  attractive  to  consumers  relative  to 
rates  on  money  market  instruments.  If  this  occurs, 
the  marginal  cost  of  NOWs  could  fall  more  rapidly 
than  market  rates.  In  Table  3,  for  example,  the  com- 
bined  effects  of  (1)  a  reduction  in  market  interest 
from  17 percent  to  11 percent  and  (2)  an  increase  in 
the  proportion  of  new  funds  flowing  into  NOWs  at 
banks  from  10  percent  to  25  percent  will  reduce  the 
marginal  cost  of  NOWs  at  banks  by  nearly  16  per- 
cent  (from  31.4  percent  to  15.6  percent). 
Summary 
The  analysis  in  the  preceding  sections  has  offered  a 
framework  for  explaining  and  anticipating  alternative 
deposit  pricing  decisions  of  commercial  banks  and 
thrift  institutions.  Initial  experience  with  NOW  ac- 
counts  confirms  the  theoretical  conclusion  that  com- 
petition  among  depository  institutions  for  interest- 
bearing  transaction  accounts  is  determined  by  factors 
affecting  the  marginal  costs  of  employing  alternative 
sources  of  funds.  The  future  course  for  financial 
institutions  should  also  depend  upon  these  factors. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  15 APPENDIX 
Tables  4-9  report  deposit  figures  for  depository 
institutions  in  the  District  of  Columbia  and  each  state 
within  the  Fifth  District.  These  data  reveal  that  com- 
mercial  banks  in  each  state  experienced  significant 
net  reductions  in  demand  deposit  accounts  over  the 
course  of  1981.  The  tables  show  that  North  Carolina 
banks  lost  $1,225  million  in  these  accounts  through 
the  end  of  the  third  quarter,  while  Virginia  banks 
lost  $755  million,  and  those  in  Maryland  $526  million. 
On  a  percentage  basis,  demand  deposit  outflows 
within  the  District  ranged  from  a  low  of  12  percent 
of  the  December  1980  figure  in  Maryland  to  a  high 
of  20  percent  in  North  Carolina.  ATS  accounts 
fell  in  every  state  except  Virginia,  which  experienced 
an  increase  of  over  $150  million.  ATS  deposits  in 
District  of  Columbia  credit  unions  and  telephone  and 
pre-authorized  transfer  accounts  at  Virginia  credit 
unions  fell  precipitously  in  the  first  and  second  quar- 
ters  as  most  of  these  funds  were  re-categorized  as 
personal  savings.  Commercial  banks  and  savings  and 
loan  associations  in  each  state  experienced  losses  in 
personal  savings  accounts  through  the  year,  as  did 
mutual  savings  banks  in  Maryland. 
NOW  deposits  in  depository  institutions  grew 
rapidly  throughout  the  District,  totalling  $995  mil- 
lion  in  North  Carolina,  $619  million  in  Maryland, 
$614  million  in  Virginia,  $573  million  in  South  Caro- 
lina,  $371  million  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and 
$355  million  in  West  Virginia  at  the  end  of  Septem- 
ber.  Commercial  banks  in  North  Carolina,  Virginia, 
and  West  Virginia  (where  thrift  competition,  as 
measured  by  1980  market  shares  of  personal  savings 
accounts,  was  less  significant  than  in  other  states) 
were  especially  successful  in  garnering  large  propor- 
tions  of  NOW  deposits,  Banks  in  each  of  these 
states  captured  over  90  percent  of  funds  in  NOW/ 
ATS/share  draft  accounts  by  September  and  con- 
tinued  to  constitute  near  monopolies  in  total  transac- 
tion  accounts.  Faced  with  stronger  thrift  competition, 
banks  in  South  Carolina,  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  Maryland  collected  84  percent,  71  percent,  and 
65  percent,  respectively,  of  NOW/ATS/share  draft 
deposits.  Banks  in  these  latter  states  continued  their 
dominance  of  total  transaction  accounts,  however, 
holding  over  90  percent  of  state  totals  at  the  end  of 
the  third  quarter. 
Savings  and  loan  associations  in  Maryland  and 
South  Carolina  held  23  percent  and  13  percent,  re- 
spectively,  of  NOW/ATS/share  drafts  by  the  end  of 
the  third  quarter.  It  should  be  pointed  out,  however, 
that  S&Ls  in  these  states  held  relatively  large  por- 
tions  of personal  savings  prior  to  1981  while  commer- 
cial  banks  held  less  than  half  of these  deposits.  S&Ls 
and  credit  unions  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  which 
combined  to  control  76  percent  of  personal  savings  in 
December  1980,  held  29  percent  of  total  NOW/ 
ATS/share  drafts  by  September. 
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DEPOSITS  OF  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS1 
2,331.7  69.4  46.1  0  69.4 
2,016.4  23.5  .1  282.2  305.8 
2,015.6  20.6  .1  313.9  334.5 

















49.6  1.3  .5 
37.2  22.0  22.3 
32.8  28.3  28.7 





3.7  80.1  214.0 
4.2  85.8  210.6 
4.4  95.0  98.5 
4.6  95.9  98.9 
December  19802  2,335.2 
March  1981  2,023.6 
June  1981  2,019.9 
September  1981  1,966.7 
99.4  81.4  283.9 
41.5  390.0  538.7 
37.3  437.2  461.7 

















24.5  2,447.2  90.0  701.4  24.1  17 
56.8  2,322.3  89.2  720.2  24.9  14 
72.4  2,350.1  93.3  688.0  23.4  14 
70.8  2,306.6  92.8  679.0  24.6  16 
.2  52.1  1.9  1,447.8  49.7  17 
4.1  64.6  2.5  1,426.4  49.2  14 
6.2  63.2  2.5  1,381.3  46.9  13 
8.9  72.7  2.9  1,247.3  45.2  12 
75.4  219.4  8.1  763.9  26.2  16 
39.1  217.0  8.3  751.4  25.9  16 
21.3  105.5  4.2  874.2  29.7  16 
20.4  105.7  4.3  835.6  30.3  18 
100.0  2,718.7 
too.0  2,603.4 
100.0  2,518.8 
100.0  2,485.0 
100.0 
100.0 
2,913.1  100.0  50 
2,898.0  100.0  44 
2,943.5  100.0  43 
2,761.9  100.0  46 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
Juno  1981 
September  1981 
Totals 
Source:  Report  of  Transaction  Accounts,  Other  Deposits,  and  Vault  Cash  (FR  2900). 
Table  5 
DEPOSITS  OF  MARYLAND  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS 
($  millions) 
4,264.3  93.9  23.7  0  93.9  50.5  4,381.9  95.2  3,144.9  48.3  81  0  37 
3,764.2  76.7  21.2  337.1  413.7  70.8  4,199.2  93.4  3,072.0  48.0  76  68  21 
3,831.8  76.1  20.0  396.9  472.9  69.4  4,324.8  92.9  3,031.8  48.0  76  70  19 
3,738.6  76.1  17.0  433.2  509.3  64.8  4,264.9  91.6  2,888.5  48.6  75  71  19 
60.3  0  27.4  0  0  0  87.7  1.9  782.0  12.0  3  0  0 
57.4  0  27.6  8.0  8.0  1.4  93.0  2.1  780.3  12.2  3  3  0 
59.5  0  26.3  9.7  9.7  1.4  95.4  2.1  772.0  12.2  3  3  0 
60.7  0  23.0  10.8  10.8  1.4  94.5  2.0  725.2  12.2  3  3  0 
4.3  0  38.2  2.5  3.7  2.0  42.5  .9  2,159.1  33.2  73  10  0 
1.8  2.7  35.7  69.2  71.9  12.3  109.4  2.4  2,124.3  33.2  71  59  1 
2.1  2.8  30.2  102.3  105.1  15.4  137.4  3.0  2,091.5  33.1  69  59  1 
1.8  2.6  28.4  174.6  177.2  22.5  207.4  4.5  1,933.7  32.6  73  61  1 
.1  49.4  2.0  38.6  88.2  47.5  90.3 
.2  49.9  2.1  40.7  90.6  15.5  92.8 
.1  48.9  2.1  44.8  93.7  13.8  95.9 
.2  46.9  1.7  41.7  88.6  11.3  90.5 
424.2  6.3  15  12  5 
421.1  6.6  15  13  5 
425.0  6.7  15  13  5 
392.4  6.6  15  13  5 
4,329.0  143.3  91.3  41.1 
3,823.6  129.3  86.6  455.0 
3,893.5  127.8  165.2  553.7 









185.8  100.0  4,602.4 
584.2  100.0  4,494.4 
681.4  100.0  4,653.5 
785.9  100.0  4,657.3 
6,510.2  100.0  172  22  42 
6,397.7  100.0  165  143  27 
6,320.3  100.0  163  145  25 
5,939.9  100.0  166  148  25 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Mutual  Savings  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Source;  Report  of  Transaction  Accounts,  Other  Deposits,  and  Vault  Cash  (FR  2900). 
1 Those  data  are  reported  weekly  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  by  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  with  at  least  $15  million  in  total  deposits.  Since  smaller  institutions  do  not  report  weekly, 
those  data  are  understated  slightly. 
2 NOW  deposits  are  as  of  December  31,  1980.  All  other  data  are  overages  for  the  last  week  in  each  month. Table  6 
DEPOSITS  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS’ 




6,114.0  445.7  289.3  117.8  563.5 
4,899.6  421.6  271.5  696.6  1,118.2 
5,019.4  403.7  271.5  776.5  1,180.1 




6,966.8  98.9  2,658.4  55.2  67  3  45 
6,289.4  98.2  2,540.0  54.7  62  60  26 
6,470.9  97.9  2,500.5  55.2  61  60  23 
6,448.3  97.4  2,401.2  55.0  60  59  21 
.9  2.2  37.9  2.4  4.6  .8  43.4  .6  1,859.3  38.6  137  10  2 
1.3  2.2  30.3  46.1  48.3  4.1  79.9  1.3  1,785.0  38.4  137  113  2 
1.3  2.0  25.1  70.0  72.0  5.6  98.3  1.5  1,712.5  37.8  137  115  3 
.9  .1  22.9  102.9  103.0  7.2  126.8  1.9  1,659.2  38.0  148  121  3 
13.0  1.0  4.4  18.6  19.6  .3  37.0  .5  296.9  6.2  5  5  1 
8.6  1.4  4.6  23.9  25.3  2.1  38.5  .6  321.7  6.9  6  6  1 
8.3  1.6  4.7  29.5  31.1  2.4  44.2  .7  317.2  7.0  6  6  1 
6.9  1.6  4.8  30.7  32.3  2.3  44.0  .7  302.1  6.9  8  7  1 
6,127.9  448.9  331.6 
4,909.5  425.2  306.4 
5,029.0  407.3  301.3 
4,896.6  408.1  289.1 
138.8  587.7  100.0  7,047.2  100.0  4,814.6  100.0  209  18  48 
766.6  1,191.8  100.0  6,407.8  100.0  4,646.7  100.0  205  179  29 
875.9  1,283.2  100.0  6,613.4  100.0  4,530.2  100.0  204  181  27 
1,025.3  1,433.4  100.0  6,619.1  100.0  4,362.5  100.0  216  187  25 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Source;  Report  of  Transaction  Accounts,  Other  Deposits,  and  Vault  Cash  (FR  2900) 
Table  7 
DEPOSITS  OF  SOUTH  CAROLINA  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS’ 
($  millions) 
2,602.4  124.3  33.7  8.1  132.4  79.7  2,768.5 
2,264.8  79.5  29.4  395.3  464.7  84.3  2,768.9 
2,345.7  74.5  28.4  454.8  529.3  83.9  2,903.4 
2,187.5  68.8  25.3  488.4  557.2  83.6  2,770.0 
1.6  0  17.3  2.7  2.7  1.6  21.6 
1.7  0  15.0  61.6  61.6  11.2  78.3 
1.6  0  14.3  76.5  76.5  12.1  92.4 
1.5  0  12.7  84.2  84.2  12.6  98.4 
.1  14.3  29.4  16.8  31.1  18.7  60.6 
0  6.0  29.2  18.8  24.8  4.5  54.1 
0  6.1  28.2  18.9  25.0  4.0  53.1 
.1  5.8  27.9  19.4  25.2  3.8  53.2 
2,604.1  138.6  80.4  27.6  166.4  100.0  2,850.7 
2,266.5  85.5  73.6  475.7  551.1  100.0  2,901.3 
2,347.3  80.6  70.9  550.2  630.8  100.0  3,048.9 
2,189.1  74.6  65.9  592.0  666.6  100.0  2,921.6 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
97.1  859.6  44.2 
95.4  820.2  44.8 
95.2  824.7  46.0 









Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
.8  926.5  47.6  64  5 
2.7  846.3  46.2  64  51 
3.0  802.7  44.8  64  51 
3.4  752.1  44.0  64  52 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
2.1  159.7  8.2  8  8 
1.9  164.6  9.0  8  8 
1.7  164.0  9.2  8  8 
1.8  164.2  9.6  9  9 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
100.0  1,945.8  100.0  129  15 
100.0  1,831.1  100.0  123  110 
100.0  1,791.4  100.0  121  108 

















Source:  Report  of  Transaction  Accounts,  Other  Deposits,  and  Vault  Cash  (FR  2900). 
1 There  data  are  reported  weekly  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  by  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  with  at  least  $15  million  in  total  deposits.  Since  smaller  institutions  do  not  report  weekly, 
these  data  are  understated  slightly. 
2 NOW  deposits  are as  of  December  31,  1980.  All  other  data  are  averages  for  the  last  week  in  each  month. 
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DEPOSITS  OF  VIRGINIA  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS1 
5,387.7  634.4  5.6  0  634.4  94.8  6,027.7  93.9  3,462.3  67.4  197  1  108 
4,678.2  708.6  5.3  420.5  1,129.1  93.3  5,812.6  97.9  3,297.8  62.9  160  146  70 
4,744.2  736.2  5.3  493.7  1,229.9  92.4  5,979.5  97.7  3,214.1  63.3  158  149  59 
4,633.0  791.3  5.2  539.8  1,331.1  92.0  5,969.3  97.5  3,093.9  63.5  164  157  59 
1.8  0  37.2  .9  .9  .1  39.9  .6  1,342.6  26.1  64  7  0 
3.9  0  32.7  45.1  45.1  3.7  81.7  1.5  1,315.8  25.1  64  56  0 
6.4  0  27.5  62.0  62.0  4.7  95.9  1.6  1,239.1  24.4  64  57  0 
6.2  0  23.9  74.0  74.0  5.1  104.1  1.7  1,174.5  24.1  70  61  0 
0  5.4  316.9  28.2  33.6  5.0  350.5  5.5  334.4  6.5  15  13  2 
1.1  2.6  5.0  33.0  35.6  2.9  41.7  .7  630.0  12.0  15  13  1 
1.1  2.9  4.9  36.2  39.1  2.9  45.1  .7  628.0  12.4  15  13  1 
1.8  2.9  4.8  38.7  41.6  2.9  48.2  .8  604.8  12.4  18  14  1 
5,389.5  639.8  359.7  29.1  668.9 
4,683.2  711.2  43.0  498.6  1,209.8 
4,751.7  739.1  37.7  591.9  1,331.0 




6,418.1  100.0  5,139.3  100.0  276  21  110 
5,936.0  100.0  5,243.6  100.0  239  215  71 
6,120.5  100.0  5,081.2  100.0  237  219  60 
6,121.6  100.0  4,873.2  100.0  252  232  60 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September,  1981 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
Source:  Report  of  Transaction  Accounts,  Other  Deposits,  and  Vault  Cash  (FR  2900). 
1 These  data  are  reported  weekly  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  by  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  with  at  least  $15  million  in  total  deposits.  Since  smaller  institutions  do  not  report  weekly, 
these  data  are  understated  slightly. 
2 NOW  deposits  are as  of  December  31,  1980.  All  other  data  are  averages  for  the  last  week  in  each  month. 
Table  9 
DEPOSITS  OF  WEST  VIRGINIA  COMMERCIAL  BANKS  AND  THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS’ 
Commercial  Banks 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
1,942.1  33.6  4.0  2.1  35.7  95.5  1,981.8  99.6  1,989.9  87.1  201  1  50 
1,611.5  12.9  3.3  262.2  275.1  94.8  1,893.9  99.0  1,850.2  86.9  172  166  40 
1,538.9  12.2  2.7  306.3  318.5  94.1  1,860.1  98.7  1,782.9  86.9  172  170  38 
1,619.1  11.8  5.8  332.9  344.7  91.8  1,969.6  98.2  1,728.5  86.8  180  177  40 
Savings  and  Loans 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
2.0  0  3.3  1.0  1.0  2.7  6.3  .3  271.7  11.9  24  5  0 
1.5  0  3.1  14.2  14.2  4.9  18.7  1.0  256.8  12.1  23  22  0 
1.5  0  3.5  18.8  18.8  5.6  23.8  1.3  246.6  12.0  23  22  0 
1.6  0  3.2  22.0  22.0  5.9  26.8  1.3  237.3  11.9  25  24  0 
Credit  Unions 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
0  0  0  .7  .7  1.9  .7  .O  21.8  1.0  1  1  0 
0  0  0  .8  .8  .3  .8  .0  21.9  1.0  1  1  0 
0  0  0  1.2  1.2  .4  1.2  .1  22.5  1.1  1  1  0 
0  5.3  0  3.9  9.2  2.4  9.2  .5  25.9  1.3  2  2  1 
Totals 
December  19802 
March  1981 
June  1981 
September  1981 
1,944.1  33.6  7.3  3.8 
1,617.0  12.9  6.4  277.2 
1,540.4  12.2  6.2  326.3 
1,620.7  17.1  9.0  358.8 





100.0  1,988.8  100.0  2,283.4  100.0  226  7  50 
100.0  1,913.4  100.0  2,128.9  100.0  196  189  40 
100.0  1,885.1  100.0  2,052.0  100.0  196  193  38 
100.0  2,005.6  100.0  1,991.7  100.0  207  203  41 
1 Those  data  are  reported  weekly  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  by  commercial  banks  and  thrifts  with at  least  $15  million  in  total  deposits.  Since  smaller  institutions  do  not  report  weekly, 
these  data are  understated  slightly.  Data  for  the  entire  state  are  included  in  the  table. 
2 NOW  deposits  are  as  of  December  31,  1980.  All  other  data  are  averages  for  the  last  week  in  each  month. 
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